Attacks in Lebanon with explosives installed in mobile devices (search and search) walkie talkies, radio communication devices) have not only had direct victims. One consequence of using personal technological elements as weapons is the psychosis of insecurity generated by turning a device into a potential danger. Manuel Ricardo Torresborn in Mengíbar (Jaén) 46 years ago, knows this well. He is a professor of Political Science at the Pablo de Olavide University (Seville) and his thesis was about terrorism. He has participated in research projects research of national and international character, has written several books and has been a member of the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (Europol) as well as several organisations in the field of security. In an interview, he analyses the consequences of the recent attacks in the Middle East.
Ask. How do you define attacks via personal devices?
Answer. The devices, as far as we know, have been physically manipulated. We are talking about a classic intelligence operation: infiltration into a logistics network to manipulate a series of hardware (physical part of electronic devices) in a covert manner without the recipient being aware. Regarding remote activation, we do not know much at this time.
P. What are the effects, other than personal injury?
R. One of the effects of this action is to foster a psychosis of absolute insecurity about anything around us, because it can be used by the enemy. As for Hezbollah (the pro-Iranian group in Lebanon, the main target of the attacks), it is now in a moment of extreme weakness because a large number of members of the organization have been effectively put out of action. Even those who have the capacity to continue operating are in a position of panic. They will try not to communicate with each other or take any kind of risk because they are not sure how far this infiltration goes. Their infrastructure is now difficult to defend by a group that is depleted overnight. Tactically, it is very relevant because it achieves two things: physical damage to people and the isolation of the organization, which would now have many problems coordinating, organizing a retaliation or even defending itself against a clear attack by Israel.
P. Is it so relevant?
R. When you suffer such a traumatic event, you tend to distrust anything that is connected and that is not face-to-face interactions. For a group like Hezbollah, that is very problematic. It is one of the paradoxes that are studied in the field of terrorism: for an armed organization, growing and mobilizing a number of people that allows it to carry out more ambitious operations is an advantage; but at the same time, it forces that organization to begin to bureaucratize the processes and, inevitably, resort to modern communications. Managing an organization that mobilizes thousands of people forces you to abandon procedures typical of small groups that operate clandestinely. Telephone or computer communications may be a vulnerability, but without them you cannot instantly mobilize an entire organization and coordinate it toward a single purpose. Setting up a group of isolated cells where information is not fluid and where no one has an overall vision is not very effective. It is one of the successes of this operation: it has shown that the current structure does not have much of a future.
P. What if the tactic of introducing explosives into devices is carried out in areas outside the conflict?
R. This has happened. It is not so new either. Israel has already used it in individual operations, such as the death of Yehie Ayash in Gaza in January 1996 (nicknamed The Engineer (Because he was considered Hamas’s main bomb maker, he was killed with a pre-manipulated mobile phone that was detonated remotely.) But doing this kind of thing is very complex and difficult to do successfully: you have to manipulate the device so that it reaches the recipient without raising suspicion. It is something that until now was reserved for high-value targets. What is new now is that it has been implemented on a massive scale, but possibly because of the exploitation of an opportunity. Terrorist groups have used this type of procedure. Al Qaeda, for example, also hid explosives in printers that it tried to send via commercial transport, but they were intercepted.
The novelty now is that it has been implemented on a massive scale. Al Qaeda, for example, also hid explosives in printers that it tried to send via commercial transport, but they were intercepted.
PShould we be worried?
R. Everyone is looking closely at what has happened. Not only the States themselves, but also terrorist and insurgent groups. But there is no need to be worried. The psychosis about all devices is unfounded. What has happened is not the manipulation of a general-use device to turn it into a deadly weapon. It was a physical manipulation to introduce the explosive into devices for exclusive use. It is not that someone, from a distance, has activated a device. malware (malicious program) to make the phone explode.
PCan it be considered part of hybrid warfare?
R. When we talk about hybrid warfare, we include those actions that are outside the scope of violence to weaken the enemy. Here there is a use of physical violence and I continue to see it as a traditional intelligence operation, although it has been spectacular in terms of its effects and scope. But it is not an unprecedented novelty either.
P. Do these acts succeed in scaring the general population?
R. The psychological effect is tremendous. In these attacks, unlike those in the past, there is much more correspondence between the damage caused and the fear generated. When the leader of an organization was attacked, this did not happen. In recent attacks, the victims have been everyone who had a device and it is logical that everyone can feel potentially targeted and not just those most exposed, such as the leaders of the organization. Now any member of the rank and file or someone who performs auxiliary functions can be a victim.
What has happened is not a manipulation of a general-purpose device to turn it into a deadly weapon. It is not that someone, from a distance, has activated a malware (malicious program) to make the phone explode
P. Do attacks force us to review security protocols in the supply chains of any device?
R. This fear already existed and is behind the policy of vetoing certain Chinese companies for the supply of critical infrastructure. It is due to this fear of importing a technology of which we are not certain that it has not been manipulated to be used at some point. The attacks, on the one hand, reinforce the attitude of not buying anything from someone without the absolute certainty that they cannot use it against you. It is also a lesson for Hezbollah for purchasing devices from the same firm on a massive scale.
P. Can current security methods, such as airport scanners, detect the presence of explosives on a mobile phone?
R. These systems are effective if they know what they are looking for because they adapt to the indicators of what is being sought, what the threat is and how it manifests itself. But a type of explosive can be developed with particularities that go unnoticed. In airports, we have to take off our shoes because of an attempted attack in 2002 with a powerful explosive hidden in a wide sole.
Today’s security systems are effective if they know what they are looking for because they adapt to the indicators of what is being sought, what the threat is and how it manifests itself.
P. Are there more records of explosives in unexpected places?
R. In 2006, a liquid explosive was detected and since then, the quantities that can be brought into the airport have been limited because there are not enough resources to identify each of the liquids contained in the containers that people carry with them.
PWhat measures can be taken now?
R. If the possible form of the threat is identified, countermeasures can be taken. But in the abstract, this is practically impossible. It is a dynamic process: terrorist groups have to innovate because the procedures they used in the past are no longer useful for countermeasures. We are obliged to be equally dynamic. Measures cannot be taken when it is too late, but rather when an alarm signal or a probability is identified. It is like a game of cat and mouse. Whoever falls asleep loses. The race to find new ways and neutralize them is constant.
